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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY
~

~~

___

~

In The Matter of MARTIN LUTHER BASKERVILLE,
Petitioner,
-againstROBERT DENNISON, Chairman of the
Division of Parole,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 01-07-ST7702 Index No. 2622-07
Appearances:

Martin Luther Baskerville
Inmate No. 90-T-4745
Petitioner, Pro Se
Green Haven Correctional Facility
594 Route 216
Stormville, NY 12582-0010
Andrew M. Cuomo
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Steven H. Schwartz,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)

DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT
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George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice

The petitioner, an inmate at Green Haven Correctional Facility, has commenced the
instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent made on
August 2, 2006 in which petitioner was denied discretionary release on parole.

The

petitioner, who stands convicted of second degree murder, and first and second degree
robbery, argues that his due process rights were denied by reason that the Parole Board failed
to provide an adequate explanation with regard to its decision to deny release. He also faults
the Parole Board for not providing guidance with respect to how he could qualify for parole

in the hture. He points out that he has participated in numerous institutional programs
during his incarceration including the RSAT program, the Aggression Replacement Training
Program, the Inmate Program Associate Training, the Alternatives to Violence Project,
Inmate Program Associates Training, Substance Abuse Awareness (Islamic Therapeutic
Program), Psycho Education Trauma Group, South Exploratioflelease Readiness Program,
and the Behavior Modification Program. He maintains that he has also completed numerous
inmate program assignments.

The petitioner criticizes the Parole Board for not

acknowledging his institutional record and his efforts at rehabilitation. He indicates that he
is not a career criminal. He asserts that the executive department is carrying out a policy of
dcriying parole releasc: to violent felony offenders. In his view the Parole Board prevented
him from hlly discussing his accomplishments during the parole interview, and thereby
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violated his rights to due process. The petitioner maintains that the Parole Board did not
consider all of the statutory factors under Executive Law $ 2594, particularly those favorable
to the petitioner; and that the decision had been predetermined by the Parole Board prior to
the parole interview.
The petitioner asserts that the Parole Board relied upon erroneous information. He
maintains that the Parole Board ignored his alibi that he was incarcerated in the Bergen
County (New Jersey) Jail on the night his crimes were committed. He argues that there is
other evidence that demonstrates that he was not in the apartment at the time his victim was
killed. He also complains that the determination to deny parole release is unfair from the
standpoint that his accomplices have already been released.
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:
“Parole is denied. Given the serious nature and violent
circumstances of your in concert criminal conduct in the instant
offense of murder 2nd,robbery lstand robbery 2”d.Your multistate history of convictions dates back to 1985 and includes
larcenous and forgery related offenses. Your programming and
disciplinary records were reviewed and considered in this
decision. Your court imposed sentence is appropriate.”
As stated in Executive Law $2594 (2) (c) (A):

“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, arid that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
3
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deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release
program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s
representative [I” (Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A]).
“Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
requirements, not reviewable” (Matter of Sinopoli v New York State Board of Parole, 189
AD2d 960,960 [3rd Dept., 19931, citing Matter oi‘Xlckcc i’.

l ’ u k SLWDd. oflJtir.ule,

157 AD2d 944). If the parole board‘s decision is made in accordance with the statutory
requirements, the board‘s determination is not subject to judicial review

(see Ristau v.

Hammock, 103 AD2d 944 [3rd Dept., 19841). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality
bordering on impropriety” on the part of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate
judicial intervention (a
Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting
Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence

of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made
by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York State of Division of Parole, 294
AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).
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As pointed out by the respondent, the petitioner failed to raise the following issues in
his administrative appeal: that the Parole Board ignored the fact that his accomplices have
already been released; that the Parole Board failed to provide guidance with respect to his
fkture release; that the Parole Board decision was determined by an executive department
policy to deny parole to violent felony offenders. The Court has reviewed the petitioner's
administrative appeal and finds this to be true. The Court finds that these arguments are unpreserved for judicial review and may not now be considered (see Matter of Cruz v Travis,
273 AD2d 648 [3rdDept., 20001). Apart from the foregoing, the Court is of the fbrther view
that these arguments have no merit. There is no requirement in Executive Law $2594 (2)
(c) (A) that the Parole Board consider the fact that an inmate's accomplices have been
released. Petitioner's argument that the Parole Board is required to advise the petitioner
and/or provide guidance with regard to the programs he should take, or rehabilitative efforts
he should engage in to increase his chance for release at a fkture parole interview has no
merit (seeExecutive Law $2594 [2] [a]; 9 NYCRR $ 8002.3; Boothe v Hammock, 605 F2d

66 1 [2ndCir, 19791; Matter of Freeman v New York State Division ofparole, 2 1 AD3d 1174
[3rdDept., 20051). The record does not support petitioner's assertion that the decision was
predetermined consistent with an alleged executive branch policy mandating denial ofparole
to all violent felony offenders. The Court, accordingly, finds no merit to the argument

(see

Matter of Lue-Shing v Pataki, 30 1 AD2d 827,828 [3rd Dept., 20031; Matter of Perez v State
of New York Division ofParole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Jones v Travis,
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293 AD2d 800, 801 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Little v Travis, 15 AD3d 698 [3rd Dept.,
20051, Matter of Wood v Dennison, 25 AD3d 1056 [3rd Dept., 20061).
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the
parole interview reveals that there was almost no discussion of the crimes for which he was
incarcerated. The petitioner was provided ample opportunity to discuss his institutional
programming. He clearly made his point that he did not commit the crimes for which he was
incarcerated by reason that he was incarcerated in New Jersey on the time. His disciplinary
record was also discussed, as well as his desire to be discharged to the New Jersey State
penal system so that he can commence serving a New Jersey sentence of imprisonment. The
decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of
parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $2594 (see Matter of Whitehead
v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v. New York State Division of
Parole 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole

-9

Board consider the seriousness of the inmate's crimes and their violent nature (seeMatter of
Weir v. New York Stale Division cit'Parole, 205 AD2d 906,907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter
of Sinupuii v. New k'ork State Board ul'k'iirule, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v

Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate's criminal history (see Matter
of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d
556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight
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to each factor that it considered in determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly
discusseachone (=Matter ofFaridvTravis, supra; Matter of’Moorc 1 N C M York S t m I3d.
of Parole, 233 AD2d 653 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter of Collado v New York State Division
of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3rd Dept., 20011). Nor must the parole board recite the precise

statutory language set forth in the first sentence of Executive Law $ 2594 (2) (c) (A) (see
Matter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rdDept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere
appropriate the Board may give considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the
circumstances of the crimes for which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s
criminal history, together with the other statutory factors, in determining whether the
individual ‘will live and remain at liberty without violating the law,’ whether his or her
‘release is not incompatible with the welfare of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate
the seriousness of [the] crime as to undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New
York State Division ofParole, 3 AD3d 8 16 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594
[2] [c] [A], other citations omitted).
The Parole Board’s decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 months)

is within the Board’s discretion and was supported by the record (see Matter of Tatta v State
ofNew York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98 NY2d 604).
With regard to the alleged erroneous information relied upon by the Parole Board,
petitioner’s pre-sentence report reveals that the petitioner was convicted after a jury trial. It
indicates that the petitioner was in the apartment with his accomplices when his victim was
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killed. Notably, it is well settled that, other than at the time of sentencing, an inmate may not
challenge the accuracy of the information contained in a pre-sentence report (seeMatter of
Cox v New York State nivkion of Parole, 11 AD3d 766, 767-768 [3rd Dept., 20041;

Williams v Travis, 11 AD3d 788, 789-790 [3rd Dept., 20041)'.
With respect to petitioner's argument that the Appeals Unit failed to issue a timely
decision, the Court observes that such a failure does not operate to invalidate the underlying
administrative decision. The sole consequence is to permit the petitioner to deem his or her
administrativeremedy to be exhausted, and enable the petitioner to immediately seekjudicial
review of the underlying determination (see 9 NYCRR 0 8006.4 [c]; Graham v New York
State Division of Parole, 269 AD2d 628 [3rdDept, 20001, lv denied 95 NY2d 753; People ex
rel. Tyler v Travis, 269 AD2d 636 [3rdDept., 20001).
Turning to petitioner's arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to due
process, the Court observes that it has been repeatedly held that a constitutionally protected
liberty interest does not arise under Executive Law

0 2594, since it does not create

an

entitlementto, or legitimate expectation of release (seeBarna v Travis, 239 F3d 169 [2ndCir.,
20011; Mawin v Goord, 255 F3d 40 [2ndCir., 20011, at p. 44; Paunetto v Hammock ( 5 16 F
Supp 1367 [US Dist. Ct., SD NY, 19811; Washington v White, 805 F Supp 191 [SDNY,

'Concerning petitioner's various protests of innocence, the Court hrther notes that
petitioner's conviction was, in all respects, affirmed by the Appellate Division First
Department in 1996 (see People v Baskerville, 234 AD2d 35, lv to appeal denied 89
NY2d 1088).
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19921). The Court, accordingly, finds no due process violation.
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and finds them to be without
merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawfbl procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The
petition must therefore be dismissed.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.

This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are
returned to the attorney for the respondent who is directed to enter this
DecisiodOrder/Judgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this
DecisiodOrder with notice of entry.

ENTER
September 2 4 , 2 0 0 7
Troy, New York

Dated:

Supreme Court Justice
George B. Ceresia, Jr.

Papers Considered:
1.
2.

Order To Show Cause dated April 13,2007, Petition, Supporting Papers
and Exhibits
Respondent's Answer dated May 22,2007, Supporting Papers and Exhibits
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